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PROBLEMS FOR THE COVERING-LAW MODEL OF EXPLANATION
Eric Russert Kraemer
Department of Philosophy
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588

E iff. the following conditions are satisfied: (i) T
is a theory, (ii) C is singular and true, and (iii) E is
derivable from T and C jointly, but not from C
alone.

The standard covering-law model of explanation sets forth a formal, deductive account of explanation. The account faces two kinds of
formal objections. The fust is the problem of explanatory relevance.
This concerns the specification of formal conditions for relevant logical derivations. The second difficulty is the problem of "self" -explanation. This involves specifications which govern the role that a given
statement is allowed to play in an explanatory deduction of itself.
A revision of the standard covering-law model provides a natural way
to avoid both of these problems. And, it also has the virtue of not
being an ad hoc solution.

t

t

Although these authors abandoned this defmition for a more
complicated one, definition (I) will be sufficient for illustrating the problem of relevance, one of two formal problems
facing the DN-model.

t

What is meant by the problem of relevance? Hempel
(1966) answered when he listed the following as a "basic
requirement for scientific explanation":

INTRODUCTION

The requirement of explanatory relevance: the explanatory information adduced affords good grounds
for believing that the phenomenon to be explained
did, or does indeed occur.

The deductive-nomological (DN) or covering-law model
:"or the explanation of singular events has come under extensive criticism. This article attempts to defend this model from
·everal of the charges that have been made against it and shows
'hat these criticisms may be accommodated by reasonable
"dditions to the model. The criticism that this model is insufHcient for scientific explanation of singular events is questioned. (It is not argued here that all explanations fit the DNLlodel.)

In a subsequent passage, Hempel made clear what the criteria
are for the "good grounds" for belief afforded by DN-explanation:

DN-explanations satisfy the requirement of explanatory relevance in the strongest possible sense: the
explanatory information they provide implies the
explanadum sentence deductively and thus offers
logically conclusive grounds why the explanandum
phenomenon is to be expected.

Two formal sorts of criticisms of the DN-model for the
,'xplanation of singular events are considered. The first of
1hese is called the problem of relevance, the second, the probkm of "self' -explanation.

However, logical deducibility does not seem to be enough
to insure that the requirement of explanatory relevance is met.
Consider the following case:

THE PROBLEM
OF RELEVANCE IN DN-EXPLANATION
In their classic discussion of the covering-law model,
llempel and Oppenheim (1948) introduced something like the
f·jllowing as a plausible definition of DN-explanation of
smgular events:

(1) All chickens have two legs.
John Doe has as many legs as some chicken.
John Doe has two legs.

Definition (I): An ordered couple of sentences,
(T,C), constitutes an explanans for a singular sentence

The conclusion of (1) follows deductively from the theory and
initial conditions cited. But, there is something very odd about
91
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a theory which deals with chickens claiming to give a scientific explanation of John Doe's bipedal state. Clearly, the
conclusion is irrelevant to the theory cited. Whether John Doe
has two legs does not affect the theory that all chickens
naturally do have two legs.
Hempel's criterion for explanatory relevance as it stands
above is inadequate. A suggestion for a better one comes
from Hilpinen's (1971) discussion of the problem of relevance
in epistemic justification. He remarked:
If g is irrelevant to the justification of h, then h is
justified no matter whether we assume that g or -g
is true, that is, no matter whether g or -g is added to
our original evidence e.

excludes case (1) as irrelevant. Further, the definition also
handles one of the cases which forced Hempel and Oppenheim to abandon defmition (I), namely:

(3) (x) (Fx~x)
(Fa~a)-+Ha

Ha
In this case, Ha is clearly irrelevantly deduced; and, definition
(II) says just this. Not surprisingly, definition (II) also handles
cases equivalent to (3), such as:

(3') (x) (Fx~x)
(Fa-+& -Ga) v Ha
Ha

In other words, if the conjunction of e and -g calls h into
question, then g is relevant to the justification of h.

Again, (C & -E) is not logically equivalent to a direct-singular
contradiction of the theory cited.

To apply this suggestion to DN·explanation, let us substi·
tute theories (Ts) for h's, sets of initial conditions (C's) for
e's, and explananda (E's) for g's. A definition of the concept
of a direct-singular contradiction is needed.

Although definition (II) accommodates many problem
cases, it is not completely satisfactory, for it excludes instances which should be allowed as perfectly acceptable DNexplanations, such as:

D is a direct-singular contradiction of T = Df. (i) D
is singular, and (ii) existential quantification over D
may produce something logically equivalent to not T.

For example, 'VFa is a direct-singular contradiction of (x)(Fx),
since (Ex) (-Fx) is logically equivalent to -(x) (Fx). Similarly, (Fa & -Ga) is a direct-singular contradiction of (x) (Fx~
Gx), since (ExXFx & -Gx) is logically equivalent to -(x)
(Fx~x); but, [[(Fa~Ga)~Ha] & -Ha] is not a direct-singular contradiction of (x) (Fx~x), since even the most likely
existential version of the former, namely (Ex) [[(Fx~x)~
Ha] & -Hx], is not logically equivalent to -(x) (Fx~Gx).
Using this machinery, an appropriate modification of definition (I) to include only relevant DN-explanation is as follows:
Definition (II): The ordered pair. (T,C), relevantly
DN-explains E iff.: (i) T is a theory, (ii) C is singular
and true, (iii) E is derivable from T and C jointly,
but not from C alone, and (iv) (C & -E) is logically
equivalent to a direct-singular contradiction of T.
Definition (II) does not meet all formal difficulties, but it
does accommodate many problem cases. Observe first how
it fits the paradigm case of DN-explanation of singular events:

(2) (x) (Fx~Gx)
Fa
Ga
Since (Fa & -Ga) is a direct-singular contradiction of the
theory cited in (2), namely (x) (Fx~x), by definition (II)
case (2) is a relevant DN-explanation. The definition also

(2.1) (x) [(Fx v Gx)-+Hx]
Fa
Ha
Here (Fa & -Ha) is not a direct-singular contradiction of the
theory cited. To meet this objection, the concept of a trivial
logical consequence (TLC) is introduced:

P is a trivial-logical consequence of Q = Df. Either
(i) Q is logically equivalent to a conjunction of which
P is a conjunct, or (ii) P is logically equivalent to a
disjunction of which Q is a disjunct.
According to this definition, P is a TLC of (P & Q), (P v Q) is
a TLC of P, and P is a TLC of P [since P is logically equivalent both to (P & P) and to (P v P)].
Clause (iv) of Definition (II) may now be modified as
follows:
(iv') Either (C & -E) is logically equivalent to a
direct-singular contradiction of T, or the conjunction
of -E and a trivial-logical consequence of C is logically equivalent to a direct-singular contradiction of T.
Since (Fa v Ga) is a TLC of Fa, and [(Fa v Ga) & -Ha] is a
direct-Singular contradiction of (x) [(Fx v Gx~Ha], deductions such as (2.1) will be included as relevant DN-explanations under this modification of definition (II). It might also
be noted that deductions of the following sort are now included as good DN-explanations according to this modification:

Covering-law model of explanation
(2.2) (x) (Fx-+Gx)
Fa&Ha

explanation such as the following satisfy Hempel and Oppen·
heim's definition (I):

(4) (x) (Fx Gx)
Fa&Ra

Ga
The sort of relevance discussed here differs from that
mentioned by Hilpinen (1971) because the projects are different. Hilpinen (1971) was concerned with finding a means
for picking out those items of evidence which are relevant to
the justification of a given hypothesis, h, on a certain evidence
base, e. I am concerned with finding a criterion for picking
out those logical deductions which are relevant to a given
theory being used explanatorily in accordance with the ONmodel.
For Hilpinen (1971) there was no important restriction
on the sort of thing to be considered for relevancy to the
justification project. Whatever is such that either it or its negation affects the justification of h on e qualifies as relevant.
With ON-explanation, however, there are two restrictions.
First, in accordance with the basic gUidelines of the ON-model,
only those events which follow logically from a given theory
and set of initial conditions may be considered as prima facie
candidates for relevantly explained explananda in terms of
that theory. Secondly, not just any logical deduction will do.
The task of this section has been to specify those deductions
which actually fall within the province of the theory cited.
If it is required only that (C & -E) entail a contradiction
of the given theory, then, as demonstrated by cases (1), (3),
and (3'), theories will be placed in the position of having to
ON-explain events of a kind that are completely unrelated to
those theories. If, on the other hand, the stronger requirement is demanded, that (C & -E) or (-E & a TLC of C) be a
direct-singular contradiction of the theory cited, then it seems
possible to limit the events that are ON-explainable by a given
theory to those events of the kind mentioned in that theory.
[his latter restriction does not seem to be merely an ad hoc
maneuver. For it seems well in accordance with the rationale
·)f scientific explanation to require that theories dealing with
~vents of a given kind be able to ON-explain only particular
,nstances of that kind.
THE PROBLEM
OF "SELF"-EXPLANATION
Although irrelevant attempts at ON-explanation can be
uccessfully accommodated by the modified version of defini..ion (II), there is another serious, formal problem facing ON,'xplanation, that of "self' -explanation. By "self' -explanation
,s meant that the set of initial conditions (C) may contain
ome part (or all) of the explanandum (E), and that part is
. equired for the logical deduction of that part of the explan:tndum. According to Kim (1963), instances of partial "self'-
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(4') (x) (Fx Gx)
Fa & Ra
Ta & (Ra v Ja)

Both (4) and (4') are held to be irrelevant deduction by the
modified clause (iv') of definition (II).
"Self' -explanation seems completely foreign to the concept of ON-explanation. For as Hempel and Oppenheim
(1948) said, "Scientific explanation makes essential use of
generalized sentences." Any instance of even partial essential
"self' -explanation contradicts this maxim. This maxim is
understood to say that the whole of an explanandum and not
merely some proper part of it must be explained by making
essential use of generalized sentences. For this reason it is
somewhat disconcerting that in the same paper Hempel and
Oppenheim stated:
In every potential explanation in which the singular
component of the explanans is not dispensible, the
explanation is partly explained by itself.

They based this claim on the logical fact that the paradigm
case of ON-explanation of singular events, that is, case (2),
may be rewritten in the following equivalent way:
(2') (x) (-Fx v Gx)
(Fa v Ga) & (Fa v -Ga)
(Fa v Ga) & (-Fa v Ga)
They continued that if (Fa v -Ga) is omitted from the initial
conditions of (2'), then (2') is reduced to two parts: (i) an
instance of theoretical explanation, (x) (-Fx v Gx) entailing
(-Fa v Ga), and (ii) an instance of "self'-explanation, i.e.,
(Fa v Ga) entailing itself. On the basis of (2') they refrained
from "introducing stipulations to prohibit partial self-explanation" on the grounds that such prohibition would "mean
limiting explanation to purely theoretical explanation."
Hempel and Oppenheim's conclusions from (2') seem
confused. The most that follows from (2') is that in every potential explanation in which the singular component of the
explanans is not dispensible, the explanandum may be interpreted as being partly explained by itself. However, the
derivation in (2') does not require that some part of the
explanandum be deduced from itself. For example, the initial
conditions cited there may still be used to derive Fa; this,
when combined with the theory (x) (-Fx v Gx), yields Ga,
which in turn entails the explanandum given in (2'), without
any "self' -explanation. Cases such as (2') do not necessitate
the use of partial "self' -explanation, unlike cases such as (4)
and (4').

94

E. R. Kraemer

The DN-explanation schema given in (2') is perfectly
acceptable. First, according to definition (II), (2') is a relevant
deduction. Second, it should be pointed out that the predicate G, which introduces the possibility of partial "self'explanation in C of (2'), occurs ir.essentially there. Following
Kim (1963), the locution "A occurs in essentially in S" is used
as follows:

A occurs inessentially in S = Df. There exists a sentence S' such that S' is logically equivalent to sentence
S, and A does not occur in S'.
Clearly the C of (2') can be rewritten in an equivalent form in
which the predicate G does not appear, e.g., (Fa v Ha) &
(Fa v -Ha). Since the explanation can be derived without any
"self' -explanation, it is concluded that any partial "self'explanation that may occur in (2') is incidental, and not a
necessary part of the deduction of the explanandum.
Consider also what happens if (Fa v -Ga) is omitted from
the C in (2') as Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) suggested. The
argument then becomes:
(2") (x) (-Fx v Gx)
Fa vGa
(Fa v Ga) & (-Fa v Ga)
This attempt at DN-explanation will not satisfy the modified
definition (II), for (2") cannot meet the relevancy requirement.
Therefore, even though Hempel and Oppenheim thought
it impossible to draw a non-arbitrary limit to partial "self'explanation, a natural line does exist between those cases in
which some part (or all) of E occurs inessentially in C and
those cases in which some part of E occurs essentially in C
With this in mind, let us consider instances of relevant
explanations which are also partial "self' -explanations. These
are cases that, as Kim (1963) suggested, an adequate definition of DN-explanation should rule out.
(5) (x) (Fx~Gx)
Fa vGa
Ga

(5') (x) (Fx & Ix}+Gx)
Fa vGa
Ia
Ga

These two are not acceptable as instances of DN-explanation,
since certain singular sentences of a particularly vicious sort,
namely the explananda themselves, are essentially required
in the logical deduction of the conclusion.
These two cases make it clear that the modified definition
(II) by itself cannot solve all problem cases. This is not too
surprising, as the relevancy requirement by itself cannot exclude the following:

(6) (x) (Fx~Fx)
Fa
Fa
Case (6) is, of course, dealt with by the second half of requirement (iii), namely "E does not follow from C alone." To
accommodate cases such as (5) and (5'), the third requirement
of definition (II) may be changed to the following:
(iii') E is derivable from T and C jOintly and not
from C alone, and C does not contain E essentially.
This revision excludes (5) and (5'), for a part of E, namely E
itself, is contained essentially in each set of initial conditions
listed for these cases.
The doubly amended version of definition (II) [here
called definition (II')], which contains clauses (iii') and
(iv'), limits DN-explanation to those cases which are both
relevant and non-redundant. By "non-redundant" it is meant
that no part of the logical derivation of the explanandum
requires "self' -explanation. There is a powerful intuitive
reason for this additional requirement: if a theory is not required for every part of the derivation, then the use of DNexplanation, i.e., explanation by deduction from theories or
laws of nature, is seriously compromised. Since requirement
(iii') excludes all cases in which some form of "self'-explanation is essential, this requirement seems clearly to be justified
in Hempel's (1965) sense, "in terms of the rationale of scientific explanation."
SUMMARY
Two formal problems that arise for the covering-law or
DN-model of explanation are discussed. Means by which these
problems seemingly can be met are suggested. It is demonstrated that the solution is not ad hoc, but is motivated by
sound intuitions.
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